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Abstract
The hospitals/residents (HR) problem is a many-to-one generalization of the stable marriage (SM) problem. Researchers have
been interested in variants of stable matchings that either satisfy a set of additional contraints or are optimal with respect to some
cost function. In this paper, we show that broad classes of feasibility and optimization stable matching problems in the HR setting
can be solved efficiently provided certain tasks (such as checking the feasibility of a stable matching or computing the cost of a
stable matching) can also be done efficiently. To prove our results, we make use of an HR instance’s meta-rotation poset to explore
its stable matchings. An algorithm that can discover all the meta-rotations of the instance serves as a starting point for all our
algorithms.
c© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The hospitals/residents problem1 is a many-to-one generalization of the stable marriage problem. It has received
a lot of attention from researchers because it captures the situation faced by many real-life labor markets which use
centralized schemes to match a group of employers who can hire several people to a group of employees. An example
of this is the National Resident Match Program [1] in the US which annually matches hospitals to about 30,000
medical residents.
An instance of the hospitals/residents (HR) problem consists of a set R of n residents and a set H of m hospitals,
where each hospital h has capacity ch , the maximum number of positions available in h. Each resident ranks the
hospitals in H that are acceptable to her in strict order of preference; likewise, each hospital ranks the residents in R
that are acceptable to it in strict order of preference. A matching M for the instance is a set of resident–hospital pairs
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where in every pair the resident and the hospital are mutually acceptable to each other, every resident appears in at
most one pair, and every hospital h appears in at most ch pairs. A pair (r, h) 6∈ M forms a blocking pair with respect
to M if (i) r is unmatched and finds h acceptable or r prefers h to the hospital she is assigned to and, simultaneously,
(ii) h is not filled to capacity and finds r acceptable or h prefers r to one of the residents assigned to it. Intuitively, if
(r, h) forms a blocking pair in M then r and h are likely to break their assignments under M , causing the matching
to unravel. Thus, the goal of the HR problem is to find a matching that is stable — one that has no blocking pairs. In
their seminal paper [6], Gale and Shapley first tackled the problem in the simpler stable marriage (SM) setting where
residents and hospitals are replaced by men and women. There, every participant has a complete preference list (i.e.,
every man ranks all the women and every woman ranks all the men), and a capacity of one (i.e., every individual can
have at most one assigned partner). They introduced the deferred-acceptance algorithm to find a stable matching, and
showed that the algorithm can be extended to the more general HR setting. Consequently, they proved that every HR
instance has a stable matching which can be computed in O(nm) time.
A number of interesting variations of stable matchings have been considered in the SM setting (e.g., see [9] which
mentions many of them). Of particular interest to us are those that seek matchings that are not only stable, but also
satisfy some additional criteria. These matchings usually fall into the following two categories: stable matchings
that are feasible with respect to a set of constraints χ , or stable matchings that are optimal with respect to some
cost function c. Examples of the first type are man-exchange stable matchings where in such matchings no two
participants prefer each other’s partners over the ones they are assigned to. Examples of the second type include
minimum regret stable matchings which maximize the happiness of the most unhappy participant, and egalitarian
stable matchings which maximize the total happiness of all the participants. Computationally, the results for finding
these stable matchings have been mixed — finding a man-exchange stable matching is NP-hard [10,14] while finding
a minimum-regret or an egalitarian stable matching can be done in polynomial time [13,8,12,21,4]. Hence, we are
motivated to ask the following question — when is a variant of stable matchings solvable in polynomial time? Can we
identify broad classes of problems for which finding stable matchings for these problems are always computationally
easy?
We have chosen to address this topic in the HR setting because the majority of the large-scale applications of
stable marriage require many-to-one stable matchings. Already, an important issue is finding stable matchings that
match residents who are couples to hospitals in the same geographic region (e.g, see [19] and [9] and references
therein). During the course of our investigations, we have also found that there are many more interesting feasibility
and optimization problems for the HR setting than in the SM setting. For example, in the minimum regret stable
matching problem in the SM setting, a participant’s happiness is based on the rank of his/her partner. In the HR setting
— what should it be? There are clearly many choices (e.g., a hospital’s happiness can be based on the rank of its best
resident, or the rank of its worst resident, or on the average of the ranks of all its residents, etc.), and it is not obvious
how these choices affect the computational complexity of the problem. Additionally, there are constraints that arise in
the HR setting but when reduced to the SM setting become trivial. For example, constraints such as “hospital h must
have between 3 to 5 of its residents belonging to group A, between 2 to 4 belonging to group B, etc.” to enforce some
diversity requirements are no longer meaningful when a hospital can only have a capacity of 1.
Our main results are as follows:
• We define a class of constraints that have what we call the identification property and show that many “natural”
constraints for stable matchings in the HR setting have this property. We then prove that if all the constraints in χ
belong to this class, there is an algorithm that can determine if a feasible stable matching with respect to χ exists
in O(nm f (χ)) time where f (χ) is the worst-case time it takes to (i) verify that a stable matching M of the HR
instance satisfies all the constraints in χ , and (ii) if it does not, identifies a candidate-resident r∗ (to be defined
later) with respect to (M, X) where X is one of the constraints violated by M .
Recently, Sethuraman et al. [20] considered a version of the HR problem where the preference lists of every
couple are tiered to capture the couple’s desire to be assigned to hospitals in the same region. By using a linear
program, they can determine if there is a stable matching that honors the wish of every couple. Our result implies
that this same problem can be solved combinatorially in O(nm) time.
• We consider the generalized versions of the minimum regret stable matching and egalitarian stable matching
problems. We show that if the happiness of every participant in stable matching M is a function of the participant’s
assignment in M only, then computing the above mentioned optimal stable matchings takes O(nm f (c) + n4)
86 C. Cheng et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 400 (2008) 84–99
time, where f (c) is the worst-case time it takes to evaluate the cost of a stable matching with respect to the cost
function c. Our algorithms incorporate “fixes” so that the approaches used in [8,12], and [2] apply to a broader set
of problems.
To prove our results, we make use of an HR instance’s meta-rotation poset to explore its stable matchings. This
structure was first discovered by Irving et al. [11] for SM instances, and recently generalized by Bansal et al. [2]. We
use FindClosedSubset, an algorithm that can discover all the meta-rotations of an instance, as a starting point for all
our algorithms.
We note that the approach used in this paper is similar to that of Gusfield in [8] in that, like us, he also used a
single procedure called “breakmarriage” (due to McVitie and Wilson [15]) to solve a number of problems in the SM
setting. Furthermore, when FindClosedSubset is specialized to the SM setting, there is, in fact, a relationship between
breakmarriage and FindClosedSubset — breakmarriage is equivalent to one or more iterations of FindClosedSubset.
Except for the minimum regret stable matching problem, however, the problems Gusfield considered had more to do
with the structure of the set of stable matchings. Thus, what our results imply is that breakmarriage, when generalized
to the HR setting, is very useful for finding good stable matchings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we examine the structure of the set of all stable
matchings of an HR instance and introduce the notion of meta-rotations in this setting. In Section 3, we consider the
problem of finding feasible stable matchings and present our first main result. In Section 4, we discuss the problem of
finding optimal stable matchings and present our second main result. We conclude in Section 5.
2. The structure of the hospitals/residents problem
Let I be an HR instance. In the extended version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, if the sequence of proposals came
from the residents, the result is the resident-optimal stable matching of I , MR , because every resident r is assigned
the best hospital r could ever be assigned to in any stable matching. Similarly, if the sequence of proposals came from
the hospitals, the result is the hospital-optimal stable matching of I , MH , because h is assigned the best ch (or fewer)
residents h could ever be assigned to in any stable matching.
Let M be a stable matching of I . For each participant a ∈ H ∪ R, let pM (a) denote the set of partners assigned to
a in M . When a is a resident, pM (a) consists of a single hospital so we shall also refer to pM (a) as the partner of a
in M . The following is a useful property, which is also known as the Rural Hospital’s Theorem:
Fact 1 ([7]). Let M and M ′ be any two stable matchings of an HR instance I . For every hospital h, |pM (h)| =
|pM ′(h)|. Additionally, if |pM (h)| < ch , then pM (h) = pM ′(h). Similarly, for any resident r , |pM (r)| = |pM ′(r)|.
When |pM (h)| < ch , h is undersubscribed in M . The above fact states that h is matched to the same number of
residents in all stable matchings of I . Furthermore, when h is undersubscribed in some stable matching of I , then h
is assigned the same set of residents in all of them. Similarly, a resident is either matched in all stable matchings of I ,
or she is unmatched in all of them.
Let M ′ be another stable matching of I . We say that resident r prefers M to M ′ if r prefers pM (r) to pM ′(r);
otherwise, if pM (r) = pM ′(r), r is indifferent between M and M ′. There is also a reasonable definition as to when
hospital h prefers M to M ′ because of the following property:
Fact 2 ([18]). Suppose M and M ′ are two stable matchings of HR instance I , and pM (h) 6= pM ′(h) for hospital h.
Either h prefers all the residents in pM (h) to all residents in pM ′(h)− pM (h) or h prefers all the residents in pM ′(h)
to all residents in pM (h)− pM ′(h).
If the first case is true, we say h prefers M to M ′, and if the second case is true, h prefers M ′ to M . When
pM (h) = pM ′(h), h is indifferent between M and M ′.
It turns out that there is asymmetry between the residents’ and hospitals’ preferences.
Fact 3 ([18]). Suppose M and M ′ are two stable matchings of HR instance I , and (r, h) ∈ M but (r, h) 6∈ M ′. If r
prefers M to M ′, then h prefers M ′ to M. Likewise, if r prefers M ′ to M, then h prefers M to M ′.
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We say that M dominates M ′ (M  M ′) if each resident r prefers M to M ′ or is indifferent between the two
matchings. When M dominates M ′ and M 6= M ′, then M strictly dominates M ′. Interestingly, when each resident is
assigned the better of her partners in M and M ′, the result is a stable matching where each hospital is assigned the
poorer of its assignments in M and M ′. We shall call it the meet of M and M ′, and denote it as M ∧ M ′. Similarly,
when each resident is assigned the poorer of her assignments in M and M ′, the result is a stable matching where each
hospital is assigned the better of its assignments in M and M ′. This time, we shall call it the join of M and M ′, and
denote it as M ∨M ′. Consequently,M, the set of stable matchings of I , together with the dominance relation  form
a distributive lattice, and MR and MH are its maximum and minimum elements, respectively.
We end with the following lemma which will be useful in the later sections. Let wM (h) denote the worst resident
assigned to hospital h in M ; i.e., among all of the residents in pM (h), wM (h) has the worst ranking in h’s preference
list.
Lemma 1. Let M and M ′ be two stable matchings of I . Suppose M dominates M ′. If for some hospital h pM ′(h) 6=
pM (h) then wM (h) 6∈ pM ′(h) (i.e., wM (h) has a different partner in M ′).
Proof. Since pM (h) 6= pM ′(h), h must be fully subscribed in both M and M ′ by Fact 1, and so pM (h)− pM ′(h) 6= ∅.
Now M dominates M ′ which means that all the residents in pM (h) − pM ′(h) prefer M to M ′. According to Fact 3,
h must then prefer M ′ to M . That is, h prefers all residents in pM ′(h) to all residents in pM (h) − pM ′(h). If
wM (h) ∈ pM ′(h), this cannot happen because h prefers all residents in pM (h) − pM ′(h) to wM (h). Therefore,
wM (h) 6∈ pM ′(h). 
2.1. Meta-rotations
Since a feasible or optimal stable matching of an instance need not be its resident-optimal nor its hospital-optimal
stable matching, we need a method for exploring the instance’s stable matchings. Such methods have been developed
in the past for the SM setting, and more recently for the many-to-many stable marriage (MMSM) setting, where
not only hospitals can be matched to several residents but residents can also be matched to multiple hospitals. In [2],
Bansal et al. defined themeta-rotation poset of anMMSM instance, which is a polynomial-sized structure that encodes
all the stable matchings of an MMSM instance. Their work generalizes the notion of rotation posets previously studied
in the SM setting [11]. In what follows, we shall summarize the key results about meta-rotations and meta-rotation
posets from [2] specialized to the HR setting. We shall use these facts to develop efficient algorithms in Sections 3
and 4.
Given an HR instance I , we initially prune the preference lists of its participants as follows:
(i) First, compute MR , the resident-optimal stable matching of I . Recall from Fact 1 that some hospitals can be
undersubscribed in MR , and if so these hospitals (and their corresponding residents) have the same assignments in all
other stable matchings of I . Similarly, some residents can be unmatched in MR , and if so they remain unmatched in
all other stable matchings of I .
(ii) For each undersubscribed hospital h in MR , delete from its preference list all the residents that do not belong
to pMR (h). For each resident r that is matched to an undersubscribed hospital in MR , delete all hospitals from its
preference list except for the one in pMR (r).
(iii) For each unmatched resident r in MR , delete all hospitals from its preference list.
(iv) Finally, for each hospital h, if r is in its preference list but h is not in r ’s preference list, delete r from its list.
Do the same for the residents. Thus, the preference lists are now consistent — that is, for each resident–hospital pair
(r, h), r appears in h’s list if and only if h appears in r ’s list.
At the end of this pruning step,2 notice that if h is fully subscribed in MR (i.e., it is assigned ch residents), its
preference list consists entirely of residents that are matched to fully subscribed hospitals in MR as well. Similarly,
if r is matched in MR , its preference list consists of either a single hospital which will be its partner in all stable
matchings or several hospitals all of which are fully subscribed in MR . It is easy to verify that this initial pruning step
can be performed in O(nm) time.
2 Once the preference lists have been pruned, some information may no longer be accurate. For example, the ranks of the hospitals in resident
r ’s pruned preference list may not be the same as that in r ’s original preference list. Hence, when the feasibility of a stable matching of I is being
verified or its cost computed, one must make sure that it is done with respect to the original preference lists, not the pruned ones.
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r1 : h1 h2* h4
r2 : h2 h1* h4
r3 : h1* h2 h3
r4 : h3* h1 h2
r5 : h3*
r6 : h4* h1
h1 : r4 r2* r3* r6 r1
h2 : r1* r2 r3 r4 r5
h3 : r5* r3 r4*
h4 : r2 r6* r4
Fig. 1. An HR instance with six residents and four hospitals. The capacities of the hospitals h1, h2, h3, h4 are 2, 1, 2, 2 respectively. The resident-
optimal stable matching MR is indicated by the underline. There is one exposed meta-rotation ρ = (r1, h1), (r2, h2); the stable matching obtained
by eliminating ρ is indicated by *.
Given a stable matching M 6= MH , for each resident r such that pM (r) 6= pMH (r), let sM (r) denote the first
hospital h on r ’s preference list that succeeds pM (r) such that h prefers r over wM (h). A candidate for sM (r),
for example, is pMH (r) but there may be other eligible hospitals in front of pMH (r) in r ’s preference list. If there
exists an ordered list of resident–hospital pairs ρ = (r0, h0), (r1, h1), . . . , (rk−1, hk−1) such that ri = wM (hi ) and
hi+1 = sM (ri ) (addition is modulo k) for each i , then ρ is called a meta-rotation exposed in M . With slight abuse
of notation, we shall say that each of the ri ’s and the hi ’s is in ρ (i.e., ri ∈ ρ or hi ∈ ρ). To eliminate ρ from M is
to assign ri to hi+1 for i = 0, . . . , k − 1 while keeping the partner of every resident not in ρ the same; the resulting
matching is denoted as M/ρ. It is easy to verify that since M is a stable matching, so is M/ρ; moreover, M dominates
M/ρ.
An example. In Fig. 1, we are given an HR instance where the capacities for hospitals h1, h2, h3, and h4
are c1 = 2, c2 = 1, c3 = 2, and c4 = 2 respectively. The resident-optimal stable matching is MR =
{(r1, h1), (r2, h2), (r3, h1), (r4, h3), (r5, h3), (r6, h4)} (denoted by underline). Except for h4, all hospitals are filled
to capacity in MR . Consequently, resident r6 is matched to h4 in every stable matching for the instance. In the initial
pruning step, r2 and r4 will be deleted from h4’s preference list while h4 will be removed from r2’s list. Symmetrically,
h1 will be removed from r6’s preference list and r6 from h1’s list. The meta-rotation ρ = (r1, h1), (r2, h2) is exposed
in MR . The elimination of ρ in MR assigns resident r1 to hospital h2 and resident r2 to hospital h1, resulting in the
stable matching {(r1, h2), (r2, h1), (r3, h1), (r4, h3), (r5, h3), (r6, h4)} (denoted by *).
Fact 4 ([2]). For any stable matching M of HR instance I and any resident r such that sM (r) exists, no stable
matching of I matches r to a hospital h that lies between pM (h) and sM (r) in r’s preference list.
Fact 5 ([2]). No resident–hospital pair (r, h) can belong to two different meta-rotations; hence, the number of meta-
rotations is O(nm).
Suppose M 6= MH and hospital h has different assignments in M and MH . By Lemma 1, so must its worst resident
in M ,wM (h). Consequently, h′ = sM (wM (h)) exists. We shall argue next that h′ must also have different assignments
in M and MH . For wM (h), her assignment in M is more preferable than her assignment in MH . In fact, according to
Fact 4, her assignment in MH is either h′ or some hospital whom she ranked worse than h′. If her assignment in MH
is h′, then pM (h′) 6= pMH (h′) because wM (h) was not part of pM (h′). If it is not h′ and pM (h′) = pMH (h′), then
(wM (h), h′) forms a blocking pair in MH because h′ prefers wM (h) to wM (h′) by the definition of h′, and wM (h)
prefers h′ to her assignment in MH . Thus, we have shown that if h has different assignments in M and MH , then so
does h′ = sM (wM (h)).
The above discussion leads us to the following method for finding an exposed meta-rotation in M , when M 6= MH .
Select any resident r with pM (r) 6= pMH (r). Start a sequence at h0 = pM (r) and let hi+1 be sM (wM (hi )). Since
the number of hospitals is finite, eventually for some t and k, ht = ht+k . Stop when this happens. The sequence
ρ = (wM (ht ), ht ), (wM (ht+1), ht+1), . . . , (wM (ht+k−1), ht+k−1) is a meta-rotation exposed in M . Since ρ was
discovered by way of resident r , we say that r leads to ρ, or that ρ is obtained starting at r . Notice that many
different residents lead to ρ (in particular, each resident in ρ also leads to ρ), but there may also be residents r that
lead to ρ and r /∈ ρ. On the other hand, when a resident r has pM (r) = pMH (r), r cannot lead to any rotations.
Fact 6 ([2]). Suppose M and M ′ are distinct stable matchings of HR instance I , and M dominates M ′. For any
resident r∗ with pM (r∗) 6= pM ′(r∗), r∗ leads to a meta-rotation ρ exposed in M. Additionally, for all r ∈ ρ,
pM (r) 6= pM ′(r).
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FindClosedSubset(I,MT )
Compute MR ;
Prune the preference lists of I ;
M ← MR , C(MT )← ∅;
while M 6= MT
find r∗ such that pM (r∗) 6= pMT (r∗);
let ρ be the rotation obtained starting at r∗;
add ρ to C(MT );
M ← M/ρ;
return(C(MT ));
Fig. 2. The pseudocode for FindClosedSubset(I,MT ). Given MT , it finds the closed subset in R(I ) that corresponds to MT .
We also note the following useful result:
Proposition 1. Suppose M and M ′ are distinct stable matchings of HR instance I , and M dominates M ′. Suppose for
some resident r∗ such that pM (r∗) 6= pM ′(r∗), r∗ leads to meta-rotation ρ exposed in M. Either (i) M/ρ = M ′ or
(ii) M/ρ strictly dominates M ′.
Proof. When r 6∈ ρ, pM/ρ(r) = pM (r); when r ∈ ρ, pM/ρ(r) = sM (r). On the other hand, since M dominates
M ′, pM (r) = pM ′(r) or pM (r) is ranked higher than pM ′(r) in r ’s preference list. Additionally, because pM (r∗) 6=
pM ′(r∗) and r∗ leads to ρ, every r ∈ ρ has pM (r) 6= pM ′(r) by Fact 6. By Fact 4, for every r ∈ ρ, pM ′(r) has a rank
that is no better than sM (r). Thus, either M/ρ = M ′ or M/ρ strictly dominates M ′. 
Let Π (I ) be the set of all meta-rotations exposed in some stable matching of HR instance I . Let ρ, σ ∈ Π (I ).
Suppose every stable matching in which ρ is exposed can be obtained only when σ is eliminated. We say that σ is a
predecessor of ρ and denote it as σ ≤ ρ. This predecessor relation forms a partial order on Π (I ), and together we
call (Π (I ),≤) the meta-rotation poset of I . A subset of Π (I ) is said to be closed if, for every ρ in the subset, every
predecessor of ρ is also in the subset. The next fact describes a nice structural relationship between the closed subsets
of Π (I ) and the stable matchings of I .
Fact 7 ([2]). For an HR instance I , there is a one-to-one correspondence between the closed subsets of Π (I ) and
the stable matchings of I . If the closed subset C(M) corresponds to the stable matching M, then M can be obtained
from MR by successively exposing and eliminating the meta-rotations in C(M).
Example continued. In Fig. 1, the elimination of meta-rotation ρ exposes a new meta-rotation ρ′ = ((r3, h1), (r4, h3))
which was not previously exposed in MR . Here, ρ is a predecessor of ρ′. The elimination of ρ′ from MR/ρ yields
the hospital-optimal stable matching MH = {(r1, h2), (r2, h1), (r3, h3), (r4, h1), (r5, h3), (r6, h4)}. The meta-rotation
poset for the instance is a chain consisting of ρ and ρ′. It has a total of three closed subsets: C0 = ∅, C1 = {ρ}, and
C2 = {ρ, ρ′}, corresponding to the three stable matchings of the instance.
Given a closed subset of Π (I ), Fact 7 describes how to find the stable matching that corresponds to it. Let us
consider the converse. Suppose we have a “target” stable matching MT of I . Starting at MR , we need to determine
the rotations that must be eliminated to arrive at MT . If resident r∗’s current partner is different from pMT (r∗), a
greedy approach would be to find a rotation starting at r∗ and eliminating it so that r∗’s partner can get (immediately
or eventually) modified. It turns out that this is exactly the right thing to do. Fig. 2 shows the pseudocode for
FindClosedSubset(I,MT ).
Lemma 2. For any target stable matching MT of I , FindClosedSubset correctly outputs the closed subset in Π (I )
that corresponds to MT . Moreover, it can be implemented in O(nm) time.
Proof. We claim that at the beginning of every iteration of the while loop, the algorithm maintains the following
invariant: either M = MT or M strictly dominates MT . This is clearly true at the beginning of the first iteration since
MR dominates all stable matchings of I . So suppose the invariant is maintained at the beginning of iterations 1 to
k. During the kth iteration, if M 6= MT , there must be some resident r∗ such that pM (r∗) 6= pMT (r∗). According
to Fact 6, because M dominates MT , r∗ will lead to some rotation ρ exposed in M . From Proposition 1, either
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M/ρ = MT or M/ρ dominates MT . Thus, at the beginning of iteration k + 1, the invariant is still satisfied. Since a
rotation is always eliminated in an iteration and I only has O(nm) rotations, the process must finally converge to MT .
This means that C(MT ) must consist of the rotations eliminated along the way from MR to MT .
Computing MR and pruning the preference lists take O(nm) time. By following the implementation used in [9, pg.
109] to generate all the rotations of an SM instance, we can find all the rotations in C(MT ) in O(nm) total time. 
Hence, if we wish to find all the rotations of I , we simply make MH the target stable matching in FindClosedSubset
because C(MH ) = Π (I ). In the next two sections, we shall use FindClosedSubset as a starting point for designing
our algorithms. Beginning at MR , our goal is to arrive at a target stable matching that is either feasible or optimal.
Unlike the above situation though, we do not know what this target stable matching actually is or even if it exists. The
key is to use the constraints that the stable matching must satisfy, or the objective function that the stable matching is
optimizing, to guide us in choosing r∗ in every iteration of the algorithm.
3. Finding feasible stable matchings
Given an HR instance I and a set of constraints χ , a stable matching of I is feasible if it satisfies all the constraints
in χ .3 In this section, we define a class of constraints that have what we call the identification property. We show that
when χ consists entirely of constraints from this class, there is a simple algorithm that can determine if the instance
has a feasible stable matching.
Definition 1. A constraint X has the identification property if, whenever a stable matching M does not satisfy
X and M 6= MH , a resident r∗ can be identified so that every stable matching M ′ dominated by M that has
pM ′(r∗) = pM (r∗) does not satisfy X as well. We shall call r∗ a candidate-resident of (M, X).
We now describe some “natural” constraints that have the identification property.
1. Local constraints. A constraint X is local if determining whether a stable matching satisfies X requires checking
the assignment of one resident only or one hospital only. For example, a local constraint for hospital h is “the
average rank of the residents assigned to h must be at most t” or “for the set of residents assigned to h, between 3
to 5 must belong to group A, 2 to 4 must belong to group B, etc”.
If a stable matching M does not satisfy a local constraint X , there is some resident r or some hospital h so that
pM (r) or pM (h) violates X . Let M ′ be another stable matching dominated by M . If M ′ has the same assignment
for the said r or the said h, M ′ will not satisfy X as well. Hence, when it is pM (r) that violates X , r∗ = r . On
the other hand, when it is pM (h) that violates X , r∗ = wM (h) because, according to Lemma 1, if wM (h) is still
assigned to h, then the assignments of h in M and M ′ are the same.
2. Lovers’ and enemies’ constraints. Let r and r ′ be residents. A lovers’ constraint for r and r ′ is a constraint that
requires r and r ′ to be assigned to the same hospital. An enemies’ constraint for r and r ′ is the exact opposite — r
and r ′ must be assigned to different hospitals.
Suppose a stable matching M does not satisfy X , the lovers’ constraint for r and r ′. Let h and h′ be the hospitals
assigned by M to r and r ′ respectively. Notice that for stable matching M ′ dominated by M , if pM ′(h) = pM (h)
then M ′ does not satisfy X as well since r ′ is not assigned to h. When pM ′(h′) = pM (h′), we also arrive at the
same conclusion. Thus, there are two possibilities for r∗: wM (h) or wM (h′), which is again due to Lemma 1. On
the other hand, suppose M does not satisfy Y , the enemies’ constraint for r and r ′. Let h′′ be the hospital assigned
to both r and r ′. In this case r∗ = wM (h′′) because a stable matching dominated by M that assigns h′′ the residents
in pM (h′′) will still violate Y .
Although we would expect a lovers’ or an enemies’ constraint to originate from the residents since the hospitals
may not know of these relationships, a lovers’ or an enemies’ constraint can be translated into m local constraints
— one for each hospital. That is, if r and r ′ want to be in the same hospital, this can be expressed as the constraints
“r is matched to h if and only if r ′ is also be matched to h” for each h ∈ H . The same can be done if r and r ′ want
to be assigned to different hospitals.
3 IfM consists of all the stable matchings of the instance, we can think of a constraint X as a function X :M→ {0, 1} such that X (M) = 1 if
and only if M is feasible with respect to X . Thus, M is feasible with respect to χ if and only if X (M) = 1 for every X ∈ χ .
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FindFeasible(I, χ)
Compute MR and MH ;
Prune the preference lists of I ;
M ← MR ;
while some constraint X ∈ χ is not satisfied by M
if M 6= MH
let r∗ be a candidate-resident of (M, X);
if pM (r∗) 6= pMH (r∗)
let ρ be the rotation obtained starting at r∗;
M ← M/ρ;
else
return(“No feasible stable matching exists.”);
else
return(“No feasible stable matching exists.”);
return(M);
Fig. 3. The pseudocode for FindFeasible(I, χ).
3. Geographic constraints on tiered preference lists. Suppose a group of residents R′ ⊆ R wishes to be assigned
to hospitals in the same geographic region. We consider a model that is a generalization of the one suggested by
Sethuraman et al.[20] and Cantala [3]. To take into account the desire of the residents, the group partitions the set
of hospitals H into regions and jointly ranks the regions in strict order of preference. Then the residents in the
group individually rank all hospitals within each region. Thus, in the preference list of each r ∈ R′, the hospitals
in the group’s favorite region are ranked ahead of all the hospitals in the group’s second favorite region, which
in turn are ranked ahead of all the hospitals in the group’s third favorite region, etc. The individuals’ rankings of
the hospitals within each region, however, are independent. The goal is to find a stable matching that satisfies the
geographic constraint for R′ – that residents in R′ be assigned hospitals in the same tier – since hospitals in the
same tier belong to the same geographic region.
When a stable matching M does not satisfy X , the geographic constraint for R′, there are two residents r and r ′
in R′ whose assigned hospitals are in tiers i and j respectively, with i < j . Let M ′ be a stable matching dominated
by M . Clearly, M ′ must assign r ′ a hospital in some tier k, where k ≥ j . If M ′ keeps the assignment of r in M
(i.e., pM ′(r) = pM (r)), then M ′ will not satisfy X again. Thus, r∗ = r . In fact, our argument implies that every
resident r ∈ R′ whose assigned hospital in M belongs to a tier smaller than j is a candidate-resident for (M, X).
Before we proceed, we note the following about the feasible stable matchings of I .
Theorem 1. Let I be an HR instance. Let χ be a set of constraints for I , all of which have the identification property.
Denote by F the set of all feasible stable matchings of I with respect to χ . Then (F,) is a meet-semilattice.
Proof. Let M1,M2 ∈ F . Suppose the meet of M1 and M2, M1 ∧ M2, violates some constraint X ∈ χ . Then there is
some candidate-resident r∗ of (M1∧M2, X) so that if pM1∧M2(r∗) = pM ′(r∗) for some stable matching M ′ dominated
by M1 ∧ M2, M ′ must also violate X . But pM1∧M2(r∗) ∈ {pM1(r∗), pM2(r∗)}, and M1 ∧ M2 dominates M1 and M2,
both of which are feasible with respect to X . It follows that r∗ cannot exist and so M1 ∧ M2 must also be feasible.
Thus, (F,) is a meet-semilattice because the meet of any two elements of F also belongs to F . 
The above theorem implies that when F 6= ∅, the resident-optimal feasible stable matching of I is well-defined.
That is, in such a matching, every resident is matched to the best hospital she is ever matched to in any feasible stable
matching in F . We shall denote it as M Rf .
Let us now present our algorithm FindFeasible that determines if an HR instance has a stable matching that
satisfies all the constraints in some set χ . The constraints in χ are assumed to have the identification property. Like
FindClosedSubset, the algorithm begins at MR . It does not know if a feasible stable matching exists, but at every
iteration it finds and eliminates a rotation so that the matching gets closer to a potential feasible stable matching. The
pseudocode is shown in Fig. 3.
92 C. Cheng et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 400 (2008) 84–99
Theorem 2. Let I be an HR instance and χ be a set of constraints all of which have the identification property.
FindFeasible outputs M Rf if it exists, or reports that I has no feasible stable matchings with respect to χ in O(nm f (χ))
time, where f (χ) is the worst-case time it takes to determine if a stable matching of I satisfies all the constraints in
χ , and if it does not identifies a candidate-resident r∗.
Proof. Suppose F 6= ∅. We claim that the algorithm is just like FindClosedSubset where M Rf is the target stable
matching. First, we note that if MR is feasible, it must be M Rf ; otherwise, it dominates M
R
f . Second, the candidate-
resident r∗ plays the same role as r∗ in FindClosedSubset, and so either M/ρ = M Rf or M/ρ dominates M Rf at the
end of every iteration of the while loop. Thus, the algorithm must converge to M Rf .
If F = ∅, the algorithm will never exit the while loop. For the loop to continue, however, it must eliminate one
rotation. Since I has only a finite number of rotations, the algorithm will eventually run out of them. Hence, it will
halt and report that I has no feasible stable matchings.
Let us now examine the running time of the algorithm. Computing MR and MH , and pruning the preference lists
of I take O(nm) time. Since a rotation of I is eliminated at every iteration of the while loop, except possibly the last
one, the number of iterations is bounded by the number of rotations of I , which is O(nm). During each iteration, the
feasiblity of M is checked and a candidate-resident r∗ is identified. These tasks take O(nm f (χ)) total time. From
Lemma 2, searching for and eliminating rotations take O(nm) total time. Thus, FindFeasible can be implemented in
O(nm f (χ)) time. 
An interesting consequence of Theorem 2 is that if a stable matching is incomparable to M Rf in the lattice of stable
matchings of I , it must be infeasible.
In [20], Sethuraman et al. considered HR instances where every resident-couple has tiered preference lists. They
showed that the problem of determining if there is a stable matching that satisfies the geographic constraints for all the
couples can be solved using a linear program. Assuming that the tiers created by every resident-couple is given ahead
of time and every resident can be part of one couple only, verifying if a stable matching satisfies all the geographic
constraints and finding a candidate-resident if it does not takes O(n) time. Thus, Theorem 2 implies that the said
problem can be solved combinatorially in O(n2m) time. In the appendix, we show that, in fact, this running time can
be improved to O(nm) time by carefully maintaining the set of resident-couples whose geographic constraints are
violated.
4. Finding optimal stable matchings
Let I be an HR instance. Let s(a,M) be a numerical measure of the happiness of participant a with respect to stable
matching M . If s(a,M) > s(a,M ′), we say that a is happier in M than in M ′. The following problems seek stable
matchings where participants are as happy as possible: in the generalized minimum regret stable matching problem,
the goal is to find a stable matching M of I that maximizes the regret value of M , reg(M) = mina∈R∪H s(a,M); in
the generalized egalitarian stable matching problem, the goal is to find a matching M of I that maximizes the value
e(M) =∑a∈R∪H s(a,M).
In this section, we shall make the assumption that s has what we call the independence property. We then show
how the methods used to solve the two problems above in the SM setting can be extended to the HR setting.
Definition 2. Let s : (R∪H)×M→ R. The function s has the independence property if, for all a ∈ R∪H , s(a,M)
is a function of pM (a) only.
For example, when the happiness of a hospital in M is a function of the ranks of its assigned residents only –
whether it is based on its best resident, worst resident, or the average rank of its residents, etc. – and the happiness of a
resident in M is a function of the rank of her assigned hospital only, then s has the independence property. In contrast,
when the happiness of a resident is based not only on her assignment but also on that of her friends (as in the case of
the geographic constraints), s does not have the independence property.
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FindMinRegret(I, s)
Compute MR and MH ;
Prune the preference lists of I ;
M∗← MR , M ← MR ;
Let a∗ be one of the unhappiest participants in M ;
Let r∗ = a∗ if a∗ is a resident; otherwise, let r∗ = wM (a∗);
while pM (r∗) 6= pMH (r∗)
let ρ be the rotation obtained starting at r∗;
M ← M/ρ;
if mina∈R∪H s(a,M∗) < mina∈R∪H s(a,M)
M∗← M ;
let a∗ be one of the unhappiest participants in M ;
let r∗ = a∗ if a∗ is a resident; otherwise, let r∗ = wM (a∗);
return(M∗);
Fig. 4. The pseudocode for FindMinRegret(I, s).
4.1. The generalized minimum regret stable matching problem
We begin with this result:
Theorem 3. Let I be an HR instance. Suppose s : (R ∪ H)×M→ R has the independence property. Denote byR
the set of generalized minimum regret stable matchings of I with respect to s. Then (R,) is a distributive lattice.
Proof. Let M1,M2 ∈ R so reg(M1) = reg(M2). Suppose reg(M1 ∨ M2) = s(a∗,M1 ∨ M2). Since s has the
independence property, s(a∗,M1 ∨ M2) ∈ {s(a∗,M1), s(a∗,M2)}, and s(a∗,Mi ) ≥ reg(Mi ) for i = 1, 2. Hence,
reg(M1 ∨ M2) ≥ reg(Mi ) for some i ∈ {1, 2}. But M1 and M2 are generalized minimum regret stable matchings so
reg(M1 ∨ M2) ≤ reg(M1) = reg(M2). Consequently, M1 ∨ M2 ∈ R. Applying the same reasoning, M1 ∧ M2 ∈ R.
Therefore, R is a lattice. Since (R,) is a sublattice of (M,) which is distributive, it follows that (R,) is also a
distributive lattice. 
Notice thatR is never empty, so I always has a resident-optimal generalized minimum regret stable matching. We
shall denote it as M Rreg .
When s has the independence property, it turns out that we can use an algorithm very similar to FindFeasible to find
a generalized minimum regret stable matching. To see why this is the case, suppose M 6∈ R but dominates all stable
matchings in R. Let a∗ be one of the unhappiest participants in M ; i.e., s(a∗,M) ≤ s(a,M) for every a ∈ R ∪ H .
Since reg(M) = s(a∗,M) and s(a∗,M)may be dependent on pM (a∗) only, a∗’s partner in M must be different from
a∗’s partner in any of the stable matchings in R. If a∗ is a resident, let r∗ = a∗; if a∗ is a hospital, let r∗ = wM (a∗).
Hence, r∗ plays the role of a candidate-resident in this situation.
Our algorithm, as shown in Fig. 4, again begins with MR , and successively eliminates meta-rotations that originated
from r∗. Unlike FindFeasible, it does not know if it has already encountered a generalized minimum regret stable
matching, so the algorithm continues until there are no more meta-rotations from r∗. It always records the stable
matching with the largest regret value encountered so far. When the while loop ends, the algorithm returns the said
matching.
Theorem 4. Let I be an HR instance. Suppose s : (R∪H)×M→ R has the independence property. FindMinRegret
outputs M Rreg in O(nm f (r)) time where f (r) is the worst-case time it takes to evaluate reg(M) for some stable
matching M of I .
Proof. As in the correctness proof of FindFeasible, the algorithm must encounter M Rreg . At that point, M
∗ will be
set to M Rreg since all the previous stable matchings M encountered by the algorithm dominated all the generalized
minimum regret stable matchings of I . The algorithm may continue, but it will never replace M∗ with a new stable
matching.
Computing MR and MH , and pruning the preference lists of I take O(nm) time. Computing reg(M) entails
checking the s(a,M)-value for each a ∈ R ∪ H and keeping the smallest value. Clearly, the process will identify a∗,
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one of the unhappiest participants in M , so finding a∗ takes O( f (r)) time. But f (r) = Ω(n + m) so finding r∗ can
also be done in O( f (r)) time. Since the while loop goes through O(nm) iterations, the algorithm spends a total of
O(nm f (r)) time identifying a∗ and r∗. From Lemma 2, finding and eliminating rotations take O(nm) time. Hence,
the algorithm’s running time is O(nm f (r)). 
Let ranka(b) denote the rank of b in a’s preference list. In [8], Gusfield considered a version of the generalized
minimum regret stable matching problem in the SM setting where s(a,M) = −ranka(pM (a)) for every man or
woman a. The problem was divided into two parts: finding a minimum regret stable matching where the unhappiest
participant is (i) a woman (i.e., a “woman regret minimum”) and (ii) a man (i.e., a “man regret minimum”). His
algorithm for finding a woman regret minimum starts at the man-optimal stable matching, and then repeatedly applies
the breakmarriage procedure to one of the unhappiest women until the unhappiest person in the stable matching is
no longer a woman. The second to the last stable matching is returned as a woman regret minimum. A man regret
minimum is found similarly by interchanging the roles of the men and the women. We note though that there is
an inherent monotonicity assumption to the problem because of the particular choice of s(a,M); that is, as his
algorithm moves from the man-optimal stable matching to the returned woman regret minimum, every woman’s
happiness is non-decreasing. Thus, the algorithm has an obvious stopping condition. In contrast, we make no such
assumptions about s; for example, a hospital’s happiness in a matching may depend on how diverse the group of
residents assigned to it are. As FindMinRegret moves from the MR to M Rreg , the unhappiest participants can oscillate
between the hospitals and residents. Consequently, FindMinRegret has to continuously improve the happiness of a∗
until it cannot do so anymore.
4.2. The generalized egalitarian stable matching problem
Unlike earlier problems, when a stable matching M is known to dominate a generalized egalitarian stable matching,
there is no obvious candidate-resident in M ; that is, it is not clear which resident’s assignment should be modified
so that either the new matching is a generalized egalitarian stable matching or it moves closer to one. Thus, we shall
solve the generalized egalitarian stable matching problem in a different manner. Nonetheless, a part of our algorithm
will make use of FindClosedSubset.
First, we note the following when s has the independence property:
Lemma 3. Let I be an HR instance and s : (R ∪ H) ×M → R. Suppose s has the independence property.
Then, for any rotation ρ of I and for any two stable matchings M and M ′ where ρ is exposed, e(M/ρ) − e(M) =
e(M ′/ρ)− e(M ′).
Proof. Let ρ be exposed in M and M ′. When a 6∈ ρ, s(a,M) = s(a,M/ρ) because a’s happiness in a matching
may depend on her/its partner only, which is the same in M and M/ρ. Thus, e(M/ρ)− e(M) =∑a∈ρ[s(a,M/ρ)−
s(a,M)], and e(M ′/ρ) − e(M ′) = ∑a∈ρ[s(a,M ′/ρ) − s(a,M ′)]. When a ∈ ρ, a’s assignment in M and in M ′,
as well as in M/ρ and M ′/ρ, are the same. Again, since a’s happiness may be dependent on her/its partner(s) only,
s(a,M) = s(a,M ′) and s(a,M/ρ) = s(a,M ′/ρ). Hence, e(M/ρ)− e(M) = e(M ′/ρ)− e(M ′). 
Let w(ρ) = e(M/ρ) − e(M) for each rotation ρ of I . Thus, e(M/ρ) = e(M) + w(ρ). If M ′ can be obtained by
eliminating a sequence of rotations ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρk from M then e(M ′) = e(M) +∑ki=1w(ρ). We have proven the
next lemma:
Lemma 4. Let I be an HR instance. Let C be a closed subset of Π (I ), and M be the stable matching obtained by
starting at MR and eliminating the rotations in C. Suppose s : (R ∪ H) ×M→ R has the independence property.
Then e(M) = e(MR)+∑ρ∈C w(ρ).
An immediate implication of the above lemma is that when s has the independence property, finding a generalized
egalitarian stable matching is equivalent to finding a closed subset C of Π (I ) that maximizes the sum
∑
ρ∈C w(ρ).
The latter is known as the maximum closed subset problem, and has been studied by researchers [9,16,17].
In Irving et al. [12] and Bansal et al. [2], a version of the generalized egalitarian stable matching problem was
considered where s(a,M) = −∑b∈pa(M) ranka(b) for every participant a. Since s(a,M) is a function of pM (a)
only, Lemma 4 applies. To find the egalitarian stable matching, their algorithms (i) constructed a representation of the
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FindEgalitarian(I, s)
Compute MR and MH ;
Prune the preference lists of I ;
M ← MR , Π (I )← ∅;
while M 6= MH
find r∗ such that pM (r∗) 6= pMH (r∗);
find a meta-rotation ρ exposed in M starting at r∗;
add ρ to Π (I );
w(ρ)←∑a∈R∪H s(a,M/ρ)−∑a∈R∪H s(a,M);
M ← M/ρ;
Determine the precedence relations of the rotations in Π (I );
Find the maximum closed subset Cmax in Π (I );
Construct Megal by starting at MR and eliminating all the rotations in Cmax;
return(Megal );
Fig. 5. The pseudocode for FindEgalitarian(I, s).
rotation poset Π (I ), (ii) for each meta-rotation ρ, computed w(ρ) using the pairs in ρ only, and finally (iii) found a
closed subset C of Π (I ) that maximixed
∑
ρ∈C w(ρ). For example, if ρ = (r0, h0), (r1, h1), . . . , (rk−1, hk−1), step








[s(ri ,M/ρ)− s(ri ,M)] +
k−1∑
i=0




[−rankri (hi+1)+ rankri (hi )] +
k−1∑
i=0
[−rankhi (ri−1)+ rankhi (ri )]
where the last equation is correct because from ρ we know that ri ’s partners in M and M/ρ are hi and hi+1
respectively, and hi ’s partners in M and M/ρ are essentially the same except that ri is replaced by ri−1 in M/ρ.
Notice that, because of their choice of s, ρ contained all the relevant information for computing w(ρ). This need not
be the case in general. For instance, when s(h,M) is based on the rank of the best resident assigned by M to h, ρ will
not be informative enough.
To be able to determine the weights on the rotations then, what we need are the rotations of I together with stable
matchings that expose each of these rotations. We compute the weights by combining the steps for finding rotations
and assigning weights to the rotations: run FindClosedSubset where the target matching is MH . The algorithm will
find every rotation ρ which will be exposed in some matching M . At that point, compute w(ρ) = e(M/ρ) − e(M).
For completeness, we present the pseudocode of the modified algorithm, FindEgalitarian, in Fig. 5.
Theorem 5. Let I be an HR instance. Suppose s : (R∪H)×M→ R has the independence property. FindEgalitarian
outputs a generalized egalitarian stable matching of I in O(nm f (e) + n4) time where f (e) is the worst-case time it
takes to evaluate e(M) for some stable matching M of I .
Proof. We have already argued the correctness of FindEgalitarian. Let us establish its running time. Computing MR
and MH , and pruning the preference lists of I takes O(nm) time. Finding the rotations of I take O(nm) time from
Lemma 2. We also added the extra step that once a rotation ρ is found, w(ρ) is computed. Since evaluating w(ρ) can
be done in O( f (e)) time, computing the weights of all the rotations take O(nm f (e)) time. When all the rotations of
I are given, it is known that a directed graph D(I ) whose transitive closure is (Π (I ),) can be computed in O(nm)
time [2,9]. Computing the maximum-weight closed subset of D(I ) is a classical problem with known solutions [9,16,
17]; in particular, the method outlined in [9, pg. 130] yields an O(n4) solution for computing the maximum closed
subset of D(I ) once D(I ) has been computed. Hence, the total running time of the algorithm is O(nm f (e)+n4). 
Suppose we wish to find a feasible stable matching with respect to a set of constraints χ but none exists. We
might still be interested in finding an “almost feasible stable matching” — one that maximizes the number of satisfied
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constraints. Interestingly, this problem can be framed as a generalized egalitarian stable matching problem when
all the constraints in χ are local. Notice that every constraint is affiliated with one participant — the one whose
assignment will determine if a stable matching satisfies the constraint or not. Let sat (a,M) equal the number
of constraints affiliated with a that are satisfied by M . An almost feasible stable matching is one that maximizes
e(M) = ∑a∈H∪R sat (a,M). Since sat (a,M) has the independence property because it is based on pM (a) alone,
the conclusions we made in Theorem 5 apply to finding an almost feasible stable matching.
Corollary 1. Let I be an HR instance and χ be a set of local constraints. Finding a stable matching of I that satisfies
the most number of constraints in χ can be done in O(nm f (e) + n4), where f (e) is the worst case time it takes to
compute e(M) =∑a∈H∪R sat (a,M) for some stable matching M of I .
We also note the following about the generalized egalitarian stable matchings:
Theorem 6. Let I be an HR instance. Let s : (R ∪ H)×M→ R such that s has the independence property. Denote
by E the set of generalized egalitarian stable matchings of I with respect to s. Then (E,) is a distributive lattice.
Proof. For each stable matching M , recall that C(M) denotes the closed subset of Π (I ) that corresponds to M . By
Lemma 4,














= e(M ∨ M ′)+ e(M ∧ M ′).
Thus, suppose both M and M ′ belong to E . We have that e(M) + e(M ′) = e(M ∨ M ′) + e(M ∧ M ′). But
e(M ∧M ′) ≤ e(M) and e(M ∨M ′) ≤ e(M ′) because M and M ′ are generalized egalitarian stable matchings. Hence,
it must be the case that e(M ∧ M ′) = e(M) and e(M ∨ M ′) = e(M ′) so M ∧ M ′ and M ∨ M ′ belong to E . Again,
because (E,) is a sublattice of (M,), it follows that (E,) is a distributive lattice. 
For the previous problems, we have been able to design algorithms that always produced the resident-optimal
solution; in this problem, we cannot make such guarantees because the solution will be based on the algorithm for
solving the maximum closed subset. Finally, we note that our above proof also implies that the function e is modular,
a type of function on distributive lattices that has been studied by mathematicians. In fact, FindEgalitarian resembles
the general approach used by Fujishige [5] to find the optimal value of a modular function.
5. Final remarks
In this paper, we have shown that there are broad classes of feasibility and optimization problems in the HR
setting that can be solved efficiently, provided certain tasks can also be accomplished efficiently. In particular, (i) we
introduced the class of constraints with the identification property, showed that many natural constraints belong to this
class, and described an algorithm for determining if an HR instance has a stable matching that is feasible with respect
to a set of constraints χ , all of which have the identification property. (ii) We also considered the generalized minimum
regret and egalitarian stable matchings problems, and showed that if the happiness functions of the participants have
the independence property, then the approaches used to solve these problems in the SM setting can be extended to the
HR setting. Our algorithms are simple and straightforward; all used FindClosedSubset as a starting point for finding a
feasible or optimal stable matching. An interesting research direction is determining what classes of problems in the
HR setting do not fit our framework but can also be solved efficiently.
We end with the following constrained optimization problem: let I be an HR instance, χ be a set of constraints all
with the identification property, and s be a happiness function for the participants of I with the independence property.
Recall that F contains all the feasible stable matchings of I with respect to χ . Our goal is to find a stable matching
M ∈ F that has the largest regret value among all stable matchings in F .
Our algorithm, FindOptimal, is shown in Fig. 6. Let F ′ ⊆ F contain all the solutions to the problem. We leave
it to the reader to verify the following: (i) (F ′,) is a meet-semilattice (ii) when I has a feasible stable matching,
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FindOptimal(I, χ, s)
Compute MR and MH ;
Prune the preference lists of I ;
Mbest ← ∅;
maxvalue = −∞;
M ← MR ;
do
if M is feasible
if maxvalue < mina∈R∪H s(a,M)
Mbest ← M ;
maxvalue← mina∈R∪H s(a,M);
let a∗ be one of the unhappiest participants in M ;
let r∗ = a∗ if a∗ is a resident; otherwise, let r∗ = wM (a∗);
if pM (r∗) 6= pMH (r∗)





if M 6= MH
let X be a constraint violated by M ;
let r∗ be a candidate-resident of (M, X) ;
if pM (r∗) 6= pMH (r∗)
let ρ be the rotation obtained starting at r∗;
M ← M/ρ;
else
if Mbest 6= ∅
return(Mbest );
else
return (“No feasible stable matching exists.”);
else
if Mbest 6= ∅
return(Mbest );
else
return (“No feasible stable matching exists.”);
Fig. 6. The pseudocode for FindOptimal(I, χ, s). Note that the algorithm will terminate because a rotation is eliminated at every iteration, and I
has at most nm/2 rotations.
FindOptimal outputs M Ropt , the resident-optimal stable matching in F ′; otherwise, the algorithm returns that I has no
feasible stable matchings, and (iii) FindOptimal runs in O(nm( f (χ)+ f (r))) time.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we describe a careful implementation of FindFeasible for the HR problem where the preference
lists of every resident-couple are tiered (as described in Section 3). The goal is to find a feasible stable matching so that
whenever two residents form a couple, their assigned hospitals belong to the same tier in their respective preference
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FindFeasibleForCouples(I,C)
Compute MR and MH ;
Prune the preference lists of I ;
M ← MR ;
Use a doubly-linked list L to store all resident-couples whose assignments in M do not belong to the same tier;
while L 6= ∅
(r1, r2)← head(L);
let r∗ be the member of (r1, r2) whose assignment in M belongs to a lower tier;
if pM (r∗) 6= pMH (r∗)




report that no feasible stable matching exists;
HALT;
return(M);
Fig. 7. A more detailed implementation for FindFeasible for the HR problem for couples with tiered preference lists.
lists. This would imply that their assigned hospitals are in the same geographic region. The pseudocode is shown in
Fig. 7.
Let C denote all the resident-couples of the HR instance.4 When (r, r ′) ∈ C , r has a pointer to r ′ and vice versa.
When r ’s preference list is tiered, we use tier(r, h) to denote the tier that contains hospital h, which we assume
takes O(1) time to determine. Our implementation maintains a doubly-linked list L of all resident-couples whose
assignments in the current matching M do not belong to the same tier (i.e., (r1, r2) ∈ L when (r1, r2) ∈ C and
tier(r1, pM (r1)) 6= tier(r2, pM (r2))). Additionally, we also require that if a resident r is part of a couple in L , r has a
pointer to the couple in L so that removing a couple in L by specifying one of its members can be done in O(1) time.
Based on our implementation, we note the following:
(i) To determine if M is feasible, check if L is empty. This takes O(1) time.
(ii) To find a candidate-resident r∗ when M is not feasible, select the couple at the head of L and choose the member
of the couple whose current hospital assignment belongs to a lower tier. Again, this can be done in O(1) time.
(iii) When a rotation ρ is eliminated from M , couples who are matched to hospitals in the same tier in M but not
in M/ρ must be added to L , and couples in L who are matched to hospitals in the same tier in M/ρ must be
removed from L . Notice that these couples can be identified by examining every resident in ρ since only their
assignments are modified. Thus, to update L when ρ is eliminated from M takes O(|ρ|), where |ρ| denotes the
length of ρ.
From Lemma 2, we know that finding and eliminating rotations in FindFeasible takes O(nm) total time.
Additionally, checking if L is empty and finding r∗ also takes O(nm) total time since the number of iterations of the
while loop cannot exceed the number of rotations of I . Finally, the total time spent updating L is O(
∑
ρ∈Π (I ) |ρ|) =
O(nm) because every resident–hospital pair can be part of at most one rotation. Hence, we have shown the following:
Theorem 7. Let I be an HR instance and C be the set of resident-couples that have tiered preference lists. There is
an algorithm that can determine if I has a stable matching that assigns every resident-couple in C to hospitals in the
same tier (i.e., same geographic region) in O(nm) time.
The same careful implementation can be used when the set of constraints consist of Lovers’ and Enemies’
constraints. The doubly-linked list L will contain a list of all lovers who are not matched to the same hospital, and all
enemies who are matched to the same hospital.
4 We shall assume that a resident is part of one couple only.
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